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R&D Activities and the Technology Game:
A Dynamic Model of U.S.—Japan Competition
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an international comparison of R&D
activities in basic and applied research. The commonly—held view
that Japan is not spending much on basic technology development
cannot be empirically substantiated from the study of the
historical trends. However, the fact that in the U.S.A. the
largest proportion of industrial R&D expenditures is spent on the
defense and aero—space related industries (60%) ,whileJapan is
spending the largest proportion (60%) on the chemical,
electronics, communication and automobile industries, may
indicate that in effect Japan emphasizes the development of
applied technology.
The second part of the paper is to show how two countries,
one with heavy R&D activities in basic technology (the U.S.A.)
and the other with heavy R&D activities in applied technology
(Japan), can compete in the world market with their productivity
differences in basic and applied fields. A simple model of
differential game is presented to explain how Japan can increase
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Leading countries in technology like the U.S.A., Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom have generated scientific
breakthroughs and innovations in the past via endogenously
determined Research and Development (R&D) activities, whereas
latecomers like Japan, South Korea and most of the developing
countries have adopted the policy of technology importation from
the technological leaders. The basic characteristic of the
technological leaderst R&D activities is that they tend to invest
relatively larger amounts of funds in basic research. The
latecomers, on the other hand, invest relatively larger sums of
money in applied research and development. First by imitation,
then by improvements on the processes and products imported, the
latecomers have gained a competitive edge in export markets asthey
can now produce the same (or similar) goods at a lower cost and
export them to the world market. This aspect of intra—industry
trade competition can best be explained in terms of the comparative
cost analysis of basic and applied innovations in the trading
countries.
International competition often depends on competition to
develop technologies specific to the products traded——the
technology game. In this paper, after reviewing some R&D trends in
the U.S.A., Japan and European countries, we present a model of
technology (differential) game between two countries. It is
becoming increasingly clear that modern technologies are the
results of science—related R&D activities (see Freeman [1982] ). We
first review the post—World War II Japanese R&D activities,
emphasizing some unique characteristics. International comparisons
of R&D expenditures on basic vs. applied research will then be
presented.—2—
The differential game model presented in thispaperhas
several unique characteristics in that the firms (monopolistic) in
the two countries engage in the production of a similar product and
in the exportation of the product to the world market. These firms
also engage in R&D activities: the firm in the first country
produces both basic and applied technologies or technological
innovations, whereas the firm in the second country imports basic
technology from the firm in the first country and makes
improvements in the form of process innovations. Production and
generation of these innovations are basically dynamic and the firms
in the two countries engage in the technology differential game of
long-run profit maximization. More specifically we consider the
effects of the three parameters on the market share outcome:(1)
the index of diffusion of basic technology; (2) the index of
relative efficiency of applied research; and (3) the index of cost
sharing of basic research. The model describes a variety of cases,
depending on whether the game played is in terms of a closed or
open strategy. Under the closed strategy game, the firm with the
advantages in applied research may not necessarily dominate the
export market.
1.The Japanese R&D Activities
For the post—World War II period Japanese R&D activities may
be divided into three subperiods: (1) importation of foreign
technology; (2) adaptation and improvement of foreign technology;
and (3) development of indigenous Japanese technology——high
technology.
The 1950s was characterized by the marked increase in the
import of foreign technology into Japan. The average annual rate
of increase in foreign technology imports was more than 30%. The
ratio of the amount of expenditures on foreign technologies to the
total R&D expenditures was 0.45-—nearly half of the total R&D
activities was based on foreign technologies. This ratio
eventually went down to 0.24 in the 1960s, and to 0.10 in the
1970s, as Japan gradually adopted different R&D strategies (see
Table 1).—3—
One interesting, and also unique, aspect of theJapanese
policy regarding the importation of foreign technology was that the
Table 1. Trends of Foreign Technology Imports
in Japan
(A) Annual Percent(B) Total R&D Import of
Change in the ExpenditureForeign Technology Elasticit Importation Growth Rate Total R&D =A/B
Investment
1953—59 30.8% 25.6% 0.449 1.61
(Average)
1960—69 20.7 21.1 0.240 0.97
1970—74 9.8 20.6 0.165 0.53
1975—79 6.0 10.9
Source: Statistical Division, Japanese Prime Minister's Office and
Bank of Japan Statistics. See also Wakasugi [19831
government gave import permission to only a small number of large
firms. The government did not permit any firm to monopolize the
foreign technology, nor did it allow every firm to obtain or seek
foreign technology. Here the government's aim was to artificially
create oligopolistic cooperation and competition. This policywas
adhered to until the 1968, when the government had tocompletely
lift the ban on technology import. The number of annual
permissions to import technology jumped from 100 in the l950s to
over 1,000 in 1968 (see Table 2).—4--





Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Government
of Japan.
Japanese R&D expenditures grow at a high rate of over 20% per
year in the 1960s. At the same time, the sales of Japanese
companies also grew at a rapid rate. Among the industries which
enjoyed phenomenal growth were the chemical, textile, petroleum,
machinery, consumer—durable, electric and automobile industries.
In these industries, R&D expenditures went towards improvements and
adaptations of processes rather than basic research. Figure 1
shows the trends of R&D expenditures and the expenditures on
foreign technology import in relation to total sales in the
manufacturing sector.
There is another aspect of the Japanese Government's role in
R&D activities, The government granted tax credits and subsidies
to several selected firms in each industry. A rough estimate of
the extent of these credits and subsidies is as high as 9.1% of all
R&D expenditures in the 1960s.(See Table 3.) In particular, the
amounts of tax credits consisted of 8.7% of total R&D expenditures
in the 1960s. These subsidies are considered as direct investment
made by the Japanese government.
In the early 1970s, the character of Japanese R&D activities
changed dramatically, R&D activities shifted from the chemical,
steel and other heavy industries to the so—called "high technology"
industries. These include the computer, semi—conductor and
electronics industries. This is the area of endogenous technical
progress adopted by the Japanese firms. At the same time, Japan0.5
Figure 1. Trends of R&D Expenditures
and Foreign Technology Import
Source: Calculated from Prime Minister's Office "Report on Science



















(2) ivate U + (2)
1960—64 0.4% 8.7% 9.1%
1965—69 1.2 3.1 4.3
1970—74 1.7 2.0 3.7
1975—80 1.4 1.4 2.8
Source: Wakasugi 1119831.
started to export technologies abroad, particularly to other Asian
countries. The ratio of technology exports to technology imports
exceeded unity in the 1970s, indicating that Japan was rapidly
producing its own technologies and innovations, not only for
domestic use but also for export purposes.
Cooperation and Competition——Japanese Industrial Policy
The most misunderstood aspect of Japanese industrial and
technology policies is the belief that government policies are
solely responsible for the success of the economy. The role of the
Japanese Government in industrial policy is that it takes a "dual"
character.
First, the government serves as the guardian to certain
industries. It selects a small number of important and powerful
companies in the industry so as to protect them from domestic and
foreign competition. Those companies selected by the government
are required to work cooperatively with other companies in the
group. These selected firms jointly cooperate to produce new
technologies or new innovations. The advantage of the cooperation
of the selected firms lies in the fact that they can exploit
economies of scale and increasing returns. One company alone may
not be able to develop a drastic innovation, but five companies
together may be able to do it. A good example of this kind of
cooperative effort is the development of the so—called fifth
generation computers. The government's role in the cooperative—7—
technology game is socially accepted in Japan, while such a
practice may be completely unacceptable in other countries, like
the U.S.A., for example, where omission or exclusion of some
companies might result in a court case for the government. One can
imagine a New York Times headline for such a case!
The other aspect of the role of the Japanese Government is the
supervision of the domestic market competition among those
companies selected. This "dual" role usually comes at the second
stage, after the successful innovation has occurred. Once a new
technology is developed, the government suddenly changes its role
to that of the promoter of competition among the selected firms.
The second stage is the stage in which each firm goes back to their
own factories with the new technology and makes their own products
and competes in the domestic and world markets. The importance of
this competitive stage should never be under—emphasized. The
success of the Japanese industrial policy comes from the well—
balanced roles of cooperation in the first stage and of competition
in the second stage.
2. International Comparisons
We must first be aware of the difficulties inherent in an
attempt to make international comparisons of economic statistics.
Different countries use different definitions for the same concept,
or use the identical definitions for different concepts. The
concept of "basic" research is a case in point. "Basic research
expenditures" in one country may be in fact applied research
expenditures in another country. Nonetheless, it may be useful to
make international comparisons on the basis of such expenditures.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the central government's R&D
expenditures in five advanced countries in recent years. It is
seen that U.S.A., U.K., and France are spending a large fraction of
their total R&D expenditures on defense and military R&D, while
Japan's expenditure on this category is extremely small, only 2.4%.
On the other hand, the expenditure for the general scientific
purposes is very large in Japan (63.8%) and in Germany (48.6%).
Another interesting aspect is that a large fraction of thegovernment expenditures on R&D is for the development of industrial
technology in France, 66.7%.
Table 5 is an international comparison of the government's R&D
funding distributed to various institutions. Industries in all
countries compared, except Japan (5%) ,receiveda large sum of
money: U.S.A. =48.2%,U.K. =39.0%,W. Germany =29.5%,and
France =25.2%.One way of interpreting this apparent
contradiction for Japan is that the Japanese method of financing
R&D activities is different from other countries. Expenditures are
usually paid to nonprofit organizations rather than to industries
directly. These organizations include government enterprises
related to space exploration, atomic energy research, super
computer research, etc. This practice is understandable in view of
the Japanese government's policy discussed in the previous section.
An international comparison is made in Table 6 for the three
types of research expenditures, basic research, applied research,
and development. Universities in Germany engage in only basic
research, while Japanese universities do applied research as well
as basic research. In fact, Japanese universities engage in
applied research to a much greater extent than universities in the
other countries, 35.8% as compared with 28.1% for the U.S.A., 10.6%
for W. Germany and 3.6% for U.K. The apparent contradiction in
Table 5, that Japan spends little on industrial research, can now
be reconciled from the data in Table 6. We saw that in Table 5 a
large traction of government expenditures (45%) in Japan goes to
the universities and that amount is also used for applied research,
maybe sometimes for industries. Looking at Table 6, one finds that
industrial research activities in the U.S. and Japan are very
similar. Both spend over 75% on development, nearly 20% on applied
research and less than 5% on basic research. The overall
comparison of basic, applied and development expenditures in the
five countries is presented in Table 7. It shows that overall,
Japan, U.K. and U.S.A. have a similar distribution, while W.
Germany and France are spending relatively more on basic research.
Table 8 focuses on the U.S.A.—Japan comparison of industrial
R&D. In the U.S.A. the largest amount is spent on the aero—space—9—
related industry (24.4%), followed by the electronics and
communication industry (21.8%). On the other hand,Japan is
spending the largest proportions on the chemical industry (20%),
electronics and communication (15.6%), automobile production
(15.3%), and household electric appliances (12.7%) respectively.
It should be noted that the Japanese research effort is aimed at
the areas where Japan can compete in the inter—national market.
In Table 7, we observe that the corporation's R&D activities
in the U.S.A. and in Japan arevery similar. Over 75% of
expenditures is for development, nearly 20% is for applied
research, and less than 5% is for basic research. Table 9a and 9b
compares the largest twenty companies in the U.S.A. and Japan in
1980. They are ranked according to the amount of R&D
expenditures. It shows that prominent companies in both the U.S.A.
and Japan invest large sums of money for R&D.
We expect that international competition among these big firms
crucially hinges on how fast they can develop inventions and
innovations. The ability to dominate the international market
crucially depends on how fast they can develop new products and/or
new process innovations. To this type we now turn our attention in
Part II.— 10—
Table4. Distribution of Government's R&D
Expenditures in Various Countries
U.S.A. United Kingdom V. Germany France Japan
(1977) (1975) (1975) (1977) (1979)
Defense & Military49.6% 45.4% 12.0% 29.9% 2.4%
Space & Aero Space12.8 —— 4.3 3.4
Energy 4.0 5.6 11.7 —— 23.0
Industry Technology —— 10.1 6.7 66.7
Agriculture 1.9 —— —— —— 4.7
Health and
Environment 14.9 5.6 10.5 —— 2.1
General Scientific
Purposes 3.8 26.3 48.6 —— 63.8
Other 13.0 7.0 6.2 —— 4.0
Source: Calculated from NSF and OECD Statistics and Research Report,
Prime Minister's Office, Government of Japan.
Table 5. Distribution of Government R&D Expenditures
Among Various Institutions
U.S.A. United Kingdom W. GermanyFrance Japan
(1981) (1978) (1979) (1979)(1980)




zations 32.2 42.4 33.1 45.7 50
Industries 48.2 39.0 29.5 25.2
Source: The same as Table 4.— 11—
Table6. Basic, Applied and Development Research
in Various Countries
U.S.A. Great BritainW. Germany France Japan
(1977) (1975) (1975) (1977) (1979)
Universities
58.5% 95.2% 100.0% 89.3% 57.7% Basic
Applied 28.1 3.6 —— 10.6 35.8




17.8 20.9 33.0 22.3 18.6 Basic
Applied
Development
35•4 32.3 55.7 40.3
48.8 46.8 67.0 22.0 41.1
Industries
Basic 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.2 4.6
Applied
Development
18.9 25.4 32.0 19.5
78.1 71.2 96.7 64.8 75.9
Source: The same asTable 4.
Table 7.Overall Comparisons of Different Categories
of R&D Expenditures
U.S.A. United KindornW. GermanyFrance Japan
(1979) (1977) (1975) (1977) (1979)
Total 12.7% 16.1 22.3 21.1 15.6
Basic
Corp. 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.2 4.6
Total 23.0 25.4 77.7 34.4 25.9
Applied
Corp. 18.9 25.4 96.7 32.0 19.5




Corp. 78.1 71.2 Combined 64.3 75.9
with Applied
Source: White Paper, Government of Japan, 1982.— 12—
Table8.Shares of Research and Development
Expenditures in Different Industries
Country
.
Industry Japan (1979) U.S.A. (1977)
1.Total 100 100
2.Chemical 20.0% 11.3%
3.Iron and steel 4.9 0.9
4.Machinery 7.6 4.2







9.Precision machinery 3.2 4.9
Source: White Paper, Government of Japan, 1982.— 13—
Table9a. Leading U.S. Firms in Company—Financed R&D Expenditure




1. General Motors 2224 3.9
2. Ford 1675 4•5
3. IBM 1520 5.8
4. American Telephone
and Telegraph (AT&T) 1338 0.8
(mci. Bell and Western
Electric)
5. Boeing 767 8.1
6. General Electric 760 3.0
7. United Technologies 660 5.4
8. Eastman Kodak 520 5.3
9. International Telephone
and Telegraph (ITT) 504 2.7
10. Exxon 489 0.5
11. DuPont 484 3.5
12. Xerox 434 5.3
13. Sperry Rand 337 6.2
14. Dow Chemical 314 3.0
15. Honeywell 295 6.0
16. Hewlett Packard 272 8.8
17. Minneapolis Mining
and Manufacturing 283 4.6
18. Chrysler 278 3.0
19. Merck 234 8.6
20. Johnson and Johnson 233 4.8
Note: The exchange rate for the Yen in 1980 was 227 Yenper US
Dollar.
Source: Business Week, 6 July 1981. (See Freeman [1982] .)— 14—
Table9b. Twenty Leading Japanese Firms in Expenditures








1.Toyota Motor 104.0 3.7
2.Hitachi 98.7 5.8
3.Nissan Motor 90.0 3.3
4.Toshiba 69.0 4.8
5.Matsushita Electrical Ind. 50.0 2.9
6.Nippon Eletric 43.0 6.0
6.Mitsubishi Electric 43.0 4.0





12.Nippon Steel 27.0 1.0
13.Toyo Kogyo 20.5 2.5
14.Nippondenso 20.5 4.5
15.Takeda Pharmaceutical 20.1 4.8
16.Fuji Photo Film 18.8 6.0
17.Isuru 18.6 2.9
18.Bridgestone 18.0 4.1
19.Kobe Steel 17.7 1.7
20.Tokyo Electric Power 15.2 0.7
aFinancial year.
Source: Survey conducted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun covered
1,170 firms of which 1,015 in manufacturing and 155 in non—
manufacturing. (See Freeman [19821.)
II. A Model of the Technology Game and Intra—Industry Trade
1. Science—Related Innovations
Research and development is today a relatively integrated
process. The national R&D effort can be viewed as a "science—based
technological change" enterprise. Each country (or a typical firm
in each country) engages in R&D activities togenerate
technological change in the form of "process innovations" and/or
"product innovations". Each country competes in the world market
with the best innovations available. The success ofintra—industry
trade crucially hinges on the success of R&D investment in each
country.Basic Knowledge and























Theprocess of science—related technologicalinnovation can he
conceived of as a process of
creating (or producing) stocks of
basic (fundamental) andapplied (practical) knowledge thatserve as
inputs in the generation ofnew technologies, some of whichare
more productive than oldtechnologies and thereforeeventually
displace the old technologies via
adoption by Profit-maximizing
firms. The entire process isschematized in Figure 2.
(Input)— 16—
Essentially,the transformation of scientifically derived
kowledge to more productive technologies is a dynamic process.
First, specialized resources, such as skilled labor (scientists and
laboratory technicians) and specialized capital (laboratory
apparatus), are used to generate basic, or fundamental,
knowledge. This new knowledge constitutes an addition to the stock
of basic ideas and insights regarding physical and human nature.
The stock of basic knowledge and basic technology then serves as an
essential input in the endeavor to produce new practical ideas or
inventions. A good example of the role of basic knowledge in the
systematic process of generating practical ideas is the development
of the transistor by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's
Bell Laboratories (see Nelson [1962]). The production of new
inventions also requires the use of specialized factors of
production. The stock of applied knowledge in turn serves as an
important input in the next stage, the development stage, in which
innovative products or production technologies are readied for
commercial applications (i.e., market—tested). If the new products
demonstrate consumer acceptance and if new technologies prove to be
more cost effective than existing technologies, a diffusion stage
occurs. Least costly production technologies eventually displace
older technologies, and successful new products are imitated by
firms which are not the innovators. Thus, either by "output—
augmentation" or "factor—augmentation" (factor—saving technical
progress), the process of science—related technological progress
implies higher productivity, higher profits and larger market share
of the internationally competing firm.
Although most economists would agree that there is a cause—
and—effect (substantive) relationship between R&D and profit gains,
there is no universal agreement regarding the extent of the
relationship. One reason for this is the fact that there is no
temporal stability to the various stages of science—related
technological innovations. In some cases, a stream of past R&D
expenditures (use of specialized resources for the production of
basic and applied technologies) could lead to relatively rapid
observed improvements in profits and market shares, whereas in— 17—
othersthereverseis true.' In other words, lags tend to be
variable. Second, there is a great deal of uncertainty associated
with the production of new basic and applied knowledge. The
"production" relationship between scientific and engineering inputs
and the output of new knowledge is not a deterministicone. New
knowledge may be the outcome, hut there is no way to be assured
that it will be. Essentially, most R&D endeavors deal with the
unknown, i.e., represent an "exploration" of the unknown. Thus,
uncertainty of outcome and the variable lag between inputs and
outcomes make it extremely difficult to verify the relationship
between R&D and gains in profit and the market share.
Nonetheless,itis useful to idealize that an important
dimensionoftechnological innovation is that it is the outcome of
investment—type activities. For example, the firm reinvests a
fraction ot present profit in R&D for the purpose of enjoying
future cost—saving benefits via improvements in the efficiency of
its production technology. As long as R&D investmentsproduces a
higher rate of return (adjusting for differences in risk) than
other forms of investment, the firm's investment resources will
tend to flow into R&D—type activities. The process of
technological innovations should be studied within the context of
the efficient allocation of limited resources under institutional,
technological and market constraints. Technological innovations
may be regarded as "endogenous" change generated by the motives of
long—run profit maximization and market control.2
Studies done by industrial organization specialists have shown
that the R&D cost relation to output follows the same (U—shaped)
pattern as the cost relation of other commodities. Average cost
curves of R&D tend first to decline with respect to output, but
later they either start rising or stay at the same level. This
pattern indicates that R&D research can be viewed as one of the
factors of production, and that the production function approach
may be applied to the theory of technological innovation.— 18—
2.Innovations and Profit Maximization
The ideas presented in the previous section can be formalized.
We assume that certain levels of the (same) basic and applied
knowledge are needed to produce an output regardless of the
location of the firms. For instance, to produce automobiles in the
U.S.A. or in Japan, certain levels of the (same) basic and applied
knowledge are needed—-how gasoline engines work (basic knowledge)
and how workers and managements need to cooperate to produce
automobiles (applied knowledge). The problem to be analyzed here
is the matter of how new flow of basic and applied knowledge
(technology) can be generated by companies in the two countries so
as to enable the firms to compete in the world automobile market.
There are two main categories of research: basic and applied.
We include development efforts under the "applied" category. The
process of accumulation of knowledge and development of new
technology is endogenous. The firm may alter its stocks of basic
knowledge and applied (technical) knowledge by producing flows of
the two types of knowledge via basic and applied research. Hence,
the firm may alter the levels of basic and applied technologies by
appropriate (optimal) allocation of research and development
expenditures. Basic knowledge is considered to be an "intermediate
product" in the production of new applied technology.
In the production of a given product, we assume that there are
two countries (or two monopolistic firms, one in each country).
Country I's firm engages in the full—range of research and
development, full—range in the sense that both basic and applied
research is done, while Country II's firms concentrates on applied
research with the importation of basic technology developed in
Country I.
Country I's R&D Activities
Let A'(t) and Bit) be respectively the stocks of applied
and basic knowledge at time t for the firm in Country I. The
production (flow) of basic and applied knowledge is subjected to





where i>0 is the rate of depreciation in basic knowledge and
v > 0is the rate of depreciation in applied knowledge. The
depreciation factor takes into account thefact that a part of the
effort to produce knowledge is aimed at renewing and transferring
knowledge.An increase inthe stocks of basic and applied
knowledgedependson the "innovation" functions,f and h. Thus,
the rate of change (flow) of basic knowledge (----= B1(t))is
positively related to the specialized research workers,
employed to produce basic research, and to the research capital
b, but that rate is negatively related to the depreciation rate
.Inthe same waytherate of change (flow) of applied knowledge
1
=A1(t))depends on the specialized workers, a, and
research capital b. It is assumed here that the "innovation"
functions satisfy the concavity and other regularity conditions.
It was argued earlier that the "innovation" production functions
are usually not deterministic functions. Thus, there exists
technical uncertainty with respect to outcome. For simplicity, and
also for mathematical reasons, we ignored technical uncertainty
inherent in the production process of basic and applied knowledge.
"Innovation" functions represented by (la) and (lh) do not
fully take into account the delayed or lag effects of basic and
applied research on new innovations. There are significant time
lapses in the process of the transformation of basic knowledge into
applied knowledge and of applied knowledge into practical
innovations. Examples of this "gestation period" are numerous.
For instance, the theory of relativity antedated the development of
nuclear fission by almost forty years. The application of calculus
to most problems in the physical and social sciences did not occur
until long after the days of Newton and Leibnitz.3— 20—
Inthe innovatton" functions (la) and (Ib) the assimilation
of basic knowledge is reflected only by the partial derivatives
term .Thispartial derivative term represents the impact of
the current changes in the stock of basic knowledge on the rate of
change of applied knowledge. The faster current additions to the
stock of basic knowledge are transformed into new applied
knowledge——i.e., the faster the rate of assimilation——the higher
the value of the partial derivative. This depiction of the
relationship between basic knowledge and applied knowledge is
incomplete. In fact, the generation of new applied knowledge is a
function not only of current additions (net investment) of basic
knowledge, but also of past additions of basic knowledge. Figure 3
depicts the probable cumulative effects of investment in research
and development on new technology. The results of past investments
appear continuously, with the investment of, say, five years ago
yielding the greatest effect, The form and shape of this curve
depend on the particular research project the firm engages in.
Various weighting functions are appropriate.4
Figure 3
Profile of Innovation Outcomes
The cumulative effects of research investment are defined by:
I ion Result
Past —5 Present Future— 21—
t Flow of New Technology at t = PastResearch—Investment
Effects at T.
By writing the past research investment effects as theweighted
productof the potential technologicalprogress function and the
time—delay (weighting) function, and by substituting for the
discrete summation ,thecontinuous summation (integration), we





(2b) A1(t) =jh[a(T),b(T),E1(r)]Al(T)Wl(tT)dT uA'(t).
The weighting functions and W usually satisfy the property
t
jW!(t—-r)dt =1, i =A,B.
Then equation (2a) or (2b) states that the realizedgross increase
in technical knowledge is a weightedaverage of past values of
potential gross increase in basic knowledge. These equations
simply show that it takes time to develop new technology andnew
innovation.
R&DJctivities in Country II
LetA2(t) and B2(t) be the stocks ofapplied and basic
knowledge at time t for the firm in Country [I. Here we make the
crucial assumption that Country II does notengage in basic
research, or at least engages in very little basic research. The
firm in Country II acquires basic knowledge from the firm in
Country I. Assume that the flow of basic knowledge inCountry II— 22—
isproportional to the flow of basic knowledge produced in
Country I.
(3a) B2 = 1,
where i is the proportionality coefficient which in turn depends
on the amount of money paid as royalty and licensing fees, etc. In
general,y is not constant, but varies depending upon the nature
of the agreement between the firms in the two countries. The index
may be looked upon as the index of diffusion of basic
knowledge. When y =0,we have the case of technology embargo,
ihiiv = 1 - cFrfr'4-,-Rirni r+- i rr r'f kzc -i c'
knowledge.In general, we assume that
(3b) -= afunction of cost of acquiring B1.
If the flow of basic knowledge in Country I is of an academic and
very fundamental nature, the cost of acquiring it may be minimal.
For example, the costs of technical and academic journals may be
all that Country I has to pay. Information regarding some basic
knowledge may be obtained simply by purchasing the product which
manifests such information. In extreme cases, the flow of basic
knowledge in Country I may be obtained through illegal practices
such as industrial espionage. Also the main supply of the flow of
basic knowledge may be provided by the foreign-study system of
employees and trainees of the foreign firm. Using (3a) and (3b) we
have
(4a) B2 = (cost of acquiring B') B'.
The flow of applied knowledge in Country II is generated from
the same type of innovation function as Country I's, because
Country II is producing the identical (or very slightly different)
product as Country I. Hence, we present— 23—
(4b) A2(t) =j6h(a(t),b(T),B2(T))A2(T)W2(t_T)dT -uA2(t)
where a =specializedworkers in Country II in production of
applied technology, b capital used inproducing the flow of
applied knowledge and W is the weighting functionrepresenting
cumulative delayed or lag effects of R&Dinvestment. The technical
progress function in Country II, is in general differentfrom that
in Country I. To simplify theanalysis, we have assumed
(4c) h2 6h1 =6h,6 =constant> o.
If 6is greater than unity,Country II is more efficient in
producing the flow of applied knowledge,while if it is less than
unity, Country ii is less efficient thanCountry I. We also assume
that WA' =
WA2.Using (4c) we write the technicalprogress
function for applied innovationas
(4d) A2(t) =Lh(a(T),b(T),B2(T))A2(T)W1(t_T)dT-uA2(t).
6 =constant> 0.
In addition, if the diffusion index ofbasic technology y is
constant, then B2(t) =yB1(t)and production of applied
technology can be shown by
(4e) A2(t) =61: h(a(T),b(T),yB1(T))A2(T)Wl(tT)dT-vA2(t).
Essentiality of Basic Knowledge
The main feature of appliedtechnology is that basic knowledge
is assumed to be essential forthe production of appliedknowledge.
Looking at the extreme case in which thestock of basic knowledge is
zero, we would find that production ofapplied knowledge is— 24—
impossible.For instance, if in equation (4e) the diffusion index
is zero——complete shut off of technology transfer——thenthe flow




Thefirst expression states that without basic knowledge the
production of applied knowledge is impossible. The assumption is
quite realistic. Elementary language and numerical skills fall under
the category of basic knowledge. A researcher who has no basic
knowledge of a certain computer language could not possibly produce
useful programs written in that language. The secondexpression
states that the marginal productivity of the first unit of basic
knowledge in the production of applied knowledge is extremely
large. As an approximation, one may envision the change in applied
knowledge that is brought about by mastering simple arithmetic.
Basic knowledge itself is not worthwhile in the sense that it willbe
directly applied to produce output, but is essential to the
production of applied knowledge which directly helps to produce
output in a more efficient manner.
3.Technology Game
The firm in each country produces the identical (or slightly
differentiated) product Y(t) with the aid of factor inputs in each
country and sells it in the world market at the price of P(t). The
world market demand function is given by
(6a) P{t,Y*(t)J =P[t,y'(t)+Y2(t)},
where Y =theworld production of Y(t) =Y'-+ andy1-,
(i =1,2),are the quantities of Y produced by Country I and
Country II respectively. The independent variable t in P
represents the exogenous factors affecting the demand function.— 25—
Thecost function for each firmisgiven by
(7a) C)- =G(w'±Yt i =1,2.
A1 (t)
Here we implicitly assume that the production function ofoutput
y1 is of the constant—return—to—scaletype and that each firm
engages in cost—reducing process innovation with the stock of applied
knowledge, i.e., an increase in A1 will proportionately decrease
the cost of producing Y. In equation (7a) w(t) and r'(t)
represent respectively the wage rate and the return to capital in
each country,i =1,2.
Each firm's objective is to choose the appropriate amounts of
output y'- and appropriate flows of basic and applied knowledge in
such a way that the long—run profit is maximum. One extremecase
would be that the firm makes no additional investment in the creation
of technical progress but produces only output Y1-.Generally, this
policy is not optimal, because by investment in basic and applied
knowledge, each firm will further reduce the cost of producing
output Y1-. As long as the savings in cost exceed the revenue
increases due to the production of more Y1, the firm will invest in
technical progress ventures. This trade—off relationship can bemore
precisely studied after we specify the rules of the dynamic game
engaged by the firms in Country I and Country II.
Cournot—Nash Dynamic Game
Each firm in the two countries allocates resources under perfect
information in that each firm knows the values of all current (state)
variables of basic and applied knowledge. Each firm chooses the time
paths of the output and resources according to either a closed or
open loop control strategy.5 We assume that the technology game
which the two firms in the two countries play is a Cournot—Nash
differential game with either a closed or open loop control
strategy.— 26—
Closedvs.OpenLoop Strategies
Whatreally makes the difference between the open and closed
strategies depends on the assumption of the structure of information
available to the firms at every instant of time. The closed loop
strategy takes into account:
(a) Information on a firm's own actual performance at every
point in time.
(b) Information on his rival's strategies and the current value
ot the state variables, i.e., basic and applied knowledge
variables.
On the other hand, for the open—loop strategies, the firms totally
ignore the above mentioned information. Thus, in general, the
closed—loop strategy is more realistic and more attractive, because
it takes account of all available information useful for decision
making——the structure of perfect information pattern (Basar and
Olsder [1982] ).Inmany cases, however, it may still be appropriate
to assume that each firm adopts an open—loop control strategy of
imperfect information structure because:
(a) the cost of getting more information is not negligible,
and
(h) even if there is no such direct cost, technically it may be
very complicated for the firms to correctly estimate the
value of the current state.
Price Expectation Hypotheses
In making decisions about the choice of physical output and
research outputs, each firm must know the future course of the price
of output Y', and input prices in each country. Here, we assume
that the firm's vision for the future course of those prices is based
on the so—called rational expectations hypotheses. More
specifically, we assume that the commodity price and the factor input
prices increase at certain constant rates:
(6b) P[t,Y*(t)] =eatP[Y*(t)],Y* =y'+— 27—
• 13.t 1 1 —1 (8a) r (t) =e r
• 3.t
(8b) w1(t) =e
1w' P > 0, r1 > 0
> 0, •>0
1a
(8c) P (t) =eatP P >,0
a a1 b'
(9d) Pbj(t) =eUt I =1,2.
We assume that the commodity price p(y*) is increasing at thesame
rate,a, as the prices of inputs in the R&D sector in each country,
whereas the wage rate and the return to capital bothgrow at rate
These assumptions will ensure the existence of a long—run
Cournot—Nash equilibrium. We also assume that the social discount
rate in each country is the same and equal toa and that output
price is increasing as fast as the input prices of research factors,
but it does not exceed the social discount rate, whereas theinput
prices of regular factors increase faster than or as fast as the
output price (because of technical progress), i.e.,
(9) a > .>a > 0.
Using these assumptions, we now consider the technical progress
index in real (net) terms. Let g(t) be defined by
(10) g1(t)ert
I =1,2.
The term g1(t) measures the real effect of technical change in
applied technology.— 28—
CostSharing of Basic Research
Earlier in discussing the diffusion process of basic knowledge,
we assumed that Country II does not engage in basic research, but
pays a certain amount of royalties and licensing fees to Country I.
Let us assume that the two firms have a long—term agreement to share
the cost of developing basic technology. Let us assume that 0% of
the annual cost of developing basic technology is financed by the
firm in Country II. Hence, the cost of acquiring B' in the second
country is equal to
(11) cost of acquiring B1 =0 x costof producing
in Country II at t in Country I at t.
Under these assumption we now present the technology game. To
keep the notation simple, the subscripts "t" and "T" will be
suppressed from the equations. The firm in Country I tries to
max imize
(l2a) Long—run Net Prof it =Revenue—ProductionCost
—AppliedResearch Cost
—(1—0)xBasicResearch Cost,
while the firm in Country II tries to maximize
(12b) Long—run Net Profit =Revenue—ProductionCost
—AppliedResearch Cost
—0xBasicResearch Cost,
subject to the dynamic constraints of the "innovation" functions and
the predetermined game rules.
More formally for Country I's firm:— 29—




subject to the technological constraints,
t —(t—T)
(13h) g1=— ng1+Je
(13c) B' =— +ff(a,b)W(t—T)dT
= — a+, — a, p a—a,
given the optimal paths of the variables determinedby the firm in
Country II. For Country II's:
(14a) ax2 Jet{P(y*)y2-- (2+
b2A
bA PbBIY
—O(P1a +P1b)]dt a b
subject to the technological constraints






—a, = — a, f) a —a,— 30—
giventhe optimal pathsofthe variables determined by the firm in
Country
It should he noted that there are basically three crucial
parameters in this differential game:S =relativeefficiency
parameter for applied technology, y'= diffusionindex of basic
technology and Uthe index of cost sharing of basic research.
Their relative magnitudes will determine how the market evolves in
the long run.
4.Technological Competition and Market Shares
A simplified version of the above mentioned dynamic game is
solved in the appendix of this paper. Although the conclusions which
follow may not be universally true, they provide some useful insights
regarding the technology game taking place in the real world. First,
the results presented here are "local" results in that the
simplification of the general model is made by assuming the linearity
of the world demand function and quadratic cost functions, The main
result is that the final market performance depends on the types of
strategies which the two firms employ. The closed—loop strategy
yields the most interesting results. For instance, the firm with
relative efficiency in applied technology does not necessarily
control the market, even though the cost of sharing expenditures on
basic research is very small. This is certainly a paradox. For
instance, this implies that even though the Japanese firms have
advantages in producing output because of relative efficiency of
applied research and/or essentially
free inflow of basic technology, they need not necessarily control
the world market.
Closed—Loop Strategy
The relative market shares depend on how efficient each country
(firm) is in applied technology. Thus, if the relative (real)
efficiencies are identical g1g2, the market shares are identical




Therelationship between the index of relative efficiency of
applied research (Sand the index of diffusion of basic researchy
in the steady state is summarized in Figure 4. Thecurve AB is an
iso—share curve on which the world market is equally dividedby the
firms in the two countries. Any point above this line showsthat
Country I's firm controls the market with Y1 > Y2, whileany point
below that line indicates that Country II's firm controls themarket
with Y2 > Y1. The iso—share curve is aruonotonically increasing
function of the diffusion index y, which implies thatas the level
of diffusion of basic knowledge rises, it is more likely thatthe
second country's firm can control the market, even though its firm is
relatively inefficient in applied technology compared with the first
country's firm. This point is illustrated by Q2 in Figure 4. On
the other hand, if the diffusion index is small, therelatively
efficient applied technology in Country II is not enough toovercome
the lack of essential basic technology. This is illustratedby the
point Q1.
Next, what will happen if the index of cost sharing of basic
technology changes? Figure 5 shows that an increase in the cost
sharing of basic technology by Country II will shift the iso—share
curve downward. This is reasonable because by paying more royalties
to Country I, Country II looses the competitive edge inproduction
and trade. The extreme case of0 =1will result in the absolute
control by Country I when the iso—share curve coincides with the
horizontal axes. The other extreme case of e =0will result in
the total loss of 'the market by Country II, or the absolutemonopoly
by Country I.Equal Efficiency
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Open-LoopStrategy
When the firms do not completely utilize all available
information, as in thecaseof open—loop strategies, the results are
quite different. As shown in Figure 6, the iso—share curve always
approaches to the point where5 =1,the equal—efficiency point.
Hence, there is no possibility that the inefficient firm in applied
technology can control the market. It is more likely that Country
I's firm will control the market by restricting the diffusion index
to a lower value.
Iso—share Curve
Figure 6. Open—Loop Strategy and
the Share of the Market
Next, consider a point like in Figure 4 where, under the
closed—loop strategy, is greater than Y'. Under the structure
of information based on the open—loop strategy, this point always
represents the situation Y1 > Y2. Hence, under the open-loop
strategy Country II will never be able to control the market unless
they have relatively efficient applied technology. Another way of
looking at this point Q2 under the different strategies is that
under the structure of closed-loop perfect information pattern, the
country which does not engage in the production of basic knowledge
can still control the market by taking advantage of information
0 0.5 1— 34—
efficiency.The abundance of information helps a country even though
it is relatively inefficient in production of appliedtechnology.
The analysis presented here by no means covers all possible
outcomes of the technology game which two countries canengage in,
however, it does represent some aspects of the real world. The
country with relatively efficient technology and information
structure can overcome diffusion handicaps, while thecountry with
relatively inefficient applied technology can also control the market
by restricting the information and/or by forcing the other country to
share the cost of basic technology.— 35 —
MathematicalAppendix
The technology game presented in the paper is solved fora
special, but very important case. For simplicity: (1) We assume
that either one of the factor inputs of specialized andprofessional
categories in the two countries a, b (i =1,2,and j= A,B),
say b is assumed to be fixed so that in each country the control
variables are reduced to a, h and Y1.(2) Explicit solutions
are given in the neighborhood of the steady—state equilibrium.
Hence, the relevant functions are reduced to either quadratic or
linear functions.(3) Also in view of the Sato—Nono theorem (see
Sato [1981), Sato and Nono [19821), the integro—differential
equations for the technical progress functions are reduced to the
ordinary differential equations with appropriate weights.(4)
Finally, the model is reduced to the simplified form by introducing
the concept of the "effective marginal costs" C1 = andby
changing the control variables to Y and to the true derivatives of
the marginal coFts and of the basic technology, i.e., C1 and B1.
Hence, the model which has been explicitly worked out is expressedby





whereU' =C1,V1 =B',U2C2 and V2 =B2=yB1.Also S
and T are the cost functions of applied technology and basic
technology expressed by the quadratic forms. And finally A and
are the shadow prices of the control variables. The discussions
in the paper is based on the above model with the threeexplicit
parameters6, y, and 0.— 36
FOOTNOTE S
'For a more extensive discussion of therelationship between
scientific knowledge and its practical applications, refer to Carter
and 7illiams [1957]
2For the discussion of the aspect of relationship betweenR&D
and prodctivity gains, refer to Sato and Suzawa [1983]
3The delayed or lag effect is in technologicaldevelopment is
known as "dynamic Bohm—Bawerk" effect in the recent literature (see
Sato and Suzawa [19831).
4various forms of lag effects are considered in Sato andSuzawa
[1983, pp. 85—89]
5The mathematical implications of a Cournot—Nashdynamic
differential game under different strategies are discussed in detail
in Sato and Tsutsui [1983, 1984]
6For simplicity we normalized the initial values of and
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